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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Ernesto Gutierrez-Medina timely appeals from the Judgment and Order. 
Mr. Medina contends that he timely filed a post-conviction petition asserting that the 
newly announced rule from Padilla v. Kentucky1 applies to his unique situation. 
Therefore, the order summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition should be 
reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Medina, a citizen of Mexico, lawfully entered the United States as a worker in 
1986. (R., p.S.) The next year he married, which has resulted in four children, two of 
whom are legal permanent residents of the United States and two of whom are United 
States citizens. (R., pp.4-S.) In December 1990, Mr. Medina became a legal 
permanent resident and received a green card that expired in 2001. (R., p.S.) 
In 1995, Mr. Medina was arrested for delivery of a controlled substance. 
(R., p.S.) Although the charges were initially dismissed, the State refiled the same 
charges in a different case, a year later. (R., p.S.) Mr. Medina's trial counsel informed 
him that if he accepted the plea agreement, the conviction would not affect his 
immigration status. (R., p.6.) Accepting his trial counsel's advice, Mr. Medina entered 
an Alford plea taking advantage of the plea bargain that offered him probation. 
(R., p.7.) In 1997, the district court imposed upon him a unified sentence of five years, 
with two and one-half years fixed, suspended. (R., pp.3-4.) Mr. Medina pursued neither 
an appeal nor a post-conviction action within the regularly designated time lines. 
(R., pp.3-4.) 
1 
In July 1997, just a few months after his conviction, Mr. Medina's INS problems 
began. (R., pp.3-4.) He was served a notice by INS that alleged he was subject to 
removal from the United States due to his conviction in the delivery case. (R., p.7.) In 
September 1997, the district court released him from supervised probation. (R., pA1.) 
In November 1997, Mr. Medina was deported to Mexico. (R., p.7.) Not fully 
understanding the immigration case, Mr. Medina used his green card to reenter the 
United States. (R., pp.7-B.) In 2010, ICE arrested Mr. Medina for being in the United 
States unlawfully. (R., p.B.) At the time of the district court proceedings, Mr. Medina 
was awaiting removal from the United States. (R., p.9.) 
On March 23, 2011, Mr. Medina filed his verified petition for post-conviction relief. 
(R., pp.3-24.) Mr. Medina asserted in his post-conviction petition that, had he received 
proper advice from his counsel, he would not have pleaded guilty. (R., p.9.) 
Mr. Medina contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under both the 
federal and state constitution. (R., p.1 0.) 
The State filed a Motion For Summary Disposition and Memorandum In support 
Thereof seeking to have Mr. Medina's petition dismissed on procedural grounds. 
(R., ppAO-43.) The State alleged that Mr. Medina's petition was untimely. (R., ppAO-
43.) 
In response, Mr. Medina requested that the court equitably toll the statute of 
limitations to protect his due process rights. (R., pp.70-80.) Moreover, he asserted that 
Padilla announced a new rule and, therefore, should be retroactively applied because 
this is his first opportunity to have his claim heard. (R., pp.70-BO.) Mr. Medina also 
asserted that, due to his circumstances, this was his first opportunity to bring the action 
1 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
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in state court. (R., pp.70-80.) Pursuant to a request for additional briefing, Mr. Medina 
also explained that if Padilla announced a new rule, it was a watershed rule, subject to 
retroactivity. (R., pp.99-117.) 
The district court granted the State's motion and dismissed Mr. Medina's Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.142-144.) The court found that Padilla did announce 
a new rule. (Tr., p.12, L.9.) However, the court the rule announced was not a 
watershed rule of criminal procedure. (Tr., p.12, Ls.10-12.) The court determined that 
there was no basis for equitable tolling. (Tr., p.12, L.23-p.13, LA.) Mr. Medina timely 
appealed. (R., pp.163-166.) 
Mr. Medina filed a motion for reconsideration. (R., p.14S.) The district court 
denied the motion. (See Motion to Augment filed contemporaneously with this brief.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Medina's post-conviction petition 
because the Padilla court articulated a new watershed rule that under Idaho's unique 
jurisprudence should be retroactively applied? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Medina's Post-Conviction Petition 
Because The Padilla Court Articulated A New Watershed Rule That Under Idaho's 
Unique Jurisprudence Should Be Retroactively Applied 
A. Introduction 
Under Idaho's unique jurisprudence with regard to collateral challenges in post-
conviction, and particularly in light of Idaho's more expansive right to the competent 
representation of counsel, Mr. Medina submits that the decision in Padilla constituted a 
watershed rule and, therefore, the rule should be given retroactive application by this 
Court. Mr. Medina presented a material issue of fact that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney incorrectly advised him on immigration 
consequences rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. The 
matter should be remanded for further proceedings applying the rule announced in 
Padilla. 
B. Under Idaho's Modified Approach To The Teague Analysis, Idaho Courts Must 
Always Determine Whether The Unique Jurisprudence Of Idaho Requires A 
Different Result To The Retroactivity Analysis Than The United States Supreme 
Court 
Generally, new constitutional rules will not be applied retroactively to cases 
already final on direct review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989). The United 
States Supreme Court has identified two exceptions to the general rule. See 
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007). In collateral proceedings, substantive 
rules and watershed rules are applied retroactively. Shriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 
351 (2004). 
The United States Supreme Court recently held that Padilla v. Kentucky, 
requiring defense counsel to advise defendant about the risk of deportation arising from 
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a guilty plea, did not apply retroactively under its analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
28 (1989). Chaidez v. United States, _ U.S. _, _,133 S.Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013). The 
Court held that Padilla declared a new rule and noted that Chaidez did not argue that 
the two recognized Teague exceptions to the preclusion of retroactivity applied to his 
case. Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1107, n.3. Chaidez made no argument that Padilla was a 
watershed rule of criminal procedure. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted a modified form of the Teague analysis. See 
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 135-139 (2010). The Rhoades Court accepted the 
invitation of the U.S. Supreme Court in Danforth v. Minnesota to define each of the 
terms in the Teague analysis under state law. In Danforth, the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed whether state courts could modify the retroactivity analysis it had previously 
set forth in Teague in deciding whether to apply new case law to a collateral challenge 
where the defendant's underlying conviction was already final. Danforth v. Minnesota, 
552 U.S. 264, 267-269 (2008). The Danforth Opinion concluded that states were free to 
do so. Id. at 275-282. 
Upon remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Danforth elected not to abandon 
the general standards of review under Teague in its entirety. Danforth v. State, 761 
N.W.2d 493, 495-500 (Minn. 2009). However, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
recognized that a lock-step application of the federal standards regarding the Teague 
analysis might not be advisable in its state court determinations on collateral review. 
Therefore, the Danforth Court also held that Minnesota courts must independently 
review cases to determine whether fundamental fairness requires retroactive application 
of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. Id. at 500. 
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Following the lead of the Danforth Opinion, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's 
subsequent determination on remand to independently define the terms of the Teague 
analysis under state law, the Rhoades Court held that it is mandatory for a reviewing 
court in Idaho to "independently review requests for newly announced principles of law 
under the Teague standard": 
We now explicitly adopt the Teague standard in criminal cases on 
collateral review. Furthermore, we follow the lead of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court and hold that Idaho courts must independently review 
requests for retroactive application of newly-announced principles of 
law under the Teague standard. 
Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 136 (emphasis added). 
The Court in Rhoades explained why such independent review was necessary 
with regard to state post-conviction claims. First, the Court noted that, among the 
criticisms to the Teague approach was that the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a 
definition of a new rule that was overly broad, and therefore excluded most of the 
decisions issued with regard to constitutional questions. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138. 
Second, the Rhoades Court noted the common criticism in how narrowly the U.S. 
Supreme Court had defined the two exceptions providing retroactive application for new 
rules that were either "substantive rules" or "watershed rules." Id. Finally, and critically, 
the Rhoades Court acknowledged that the primary motivator for the strictness of the 
Teague standards under federal law was the concern against excessive interference on 
the part of the federal courts in state law determinations. The Rhoades Court expressly 
acknowledged that, in Idaho, "this Court does not have a similar concern for comity 
when interpreting whether a decision pronounces a new rule of law for purposes of 
applying Teague." Id. at 139. 
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Given this, the Idaho Supreme Court expressed throughout Rhoades that it was, 
"committed to independently analyzing requests for retroactive application of newly-
announced principles of law with regard to the uniqueness of our state, our constitution, 
and our long-standing jurisprudence." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 140. 
C. Under Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence, And In Light Of The Salient Differences 
Between Collateral Review Under The UPCPA And Federal Habeas, The Padilla 
Opinion Announced A Watershed Rule Entitled To Retroactive Application Given 
Idaho's More Expansive Right To Counsel 
In the instant case, Mr. Medina contends that the new rule announced in Padilla 
is a watershed rule and thus Teague and Chaidez does not prohibit retroactive 
application. Moreover, while the Chaidez Opinion controls the federal claim, as 
explained above, Mr. Medina asserts that the Padilla retroactivity question must be 
analyzed under Idaho's unique jurisprudence established by Rhoades v. State, 149 
Idaho 130, 135-139 (2010). 
In collateral proceedings, new rules that are either substantive rules or watershed 
rules should be retroactively applied. Shriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004). A 
substantive rule is one that "alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the 
law punishes." Id. at 353. Procedural rules are those that regulate the manner of 
determining the defendant's culpability. Id. The rule involved in this case is a 
procedural watershed rule and, therefore, should be applied retroactively. 
Watershed rules implicate the fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal 
proceedings. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990). The denial of the right to 
counsel at trial has generally been cited as an example of a watershed type of rule 
implicating the necessity of retroactivity. Id. Since Teague, the United States Supreme 
Court has yet to hold that a new rule satisfies the requirements for watershed status. 
8 
Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418, 127 S. Ct. at 1182. However, prior to Teague, the United 
States Supreme Court required retroactivity for a number of Gideon2-type violations. 
See Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968) (retroactively applying White v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) which held that a defendant has the right to counsel at 
plea hearings); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3-4 (1968) (retroactively applying 
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) holding a defendant has the right to counsel at 
probation revocation hearings); McConnell, 393 U.S. at 3 (holding that the right to 
counsel on appeal recognized in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) should be 
applied retroactively). 
1. Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence Requires A Lesser Standard For Watershed 
Rules With Regard To Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel, As 
These Claims Generally May Not Be Brought On Direct Appeal 
Mr. Medina asserts that, because under Idaho's unique jurisprudence with regard 
to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should apply a lesser standard 
for what constitutes a watershed rule than is applied under federal habeas corpus 
review pursuant to Teague. This is because such claims generally can only be brought 
under Idaho law through a collateral attack under the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act (UPCPA), rather than being brought on direct appeal and, therefore, the 
concerns of comity and finality that motivate the federal standard for watershed rules do 
not apply. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Rhoades noted that only two exceptions apply to 
permit retroactive application of new rules of law under Teague - substantive rules of 
law, which encompass only those rules that place private, individual conduct beyond 
criminal proscription; and watershed rules of fundamental fairness. Rhoades, 149 Idaho 
2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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at 138-139. But the Rhoades Court further noted that the federal courts have 
interpreted the exception for watershed rules so narrowly that the "U.S. Supreme Court 
has found no watershed rules in the 19 years since it adopted Teague." Id. 
The narrow manner in which the Teague Court interprets both exceptions is the 
direct result of concerns specific to the context of federal habeas corpus, and 
concomitant concerns that the federal courts should not unnecessarily interfere with the 
finality of state court decisions. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308-310. This is because federal 
habeas corpus, "'is not intended as a substitute for appeal, nor as a device for reviewing 
the merits of criminal trials,' but only 'to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state 
criminal justice systems.'" Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 292 (1992) (quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring)). In fact, 
the exhaustion of the claim in state court is a precondition of raising any claim in federal 
habeas. See, e.g., Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 486 (1975). This requirement 
presupposes that, in nearly all cases, the defendant in federal habeas proceedings will 
have already obtained a ruling regarding all issues raised in habeas through the state 
appellate courts from which his or her state criminal conviction arose. Id. at 486-490. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Danforlh recognized that the unique nature of federal 
habeas corpus review may lead some states to apply a lesser standard of review for 
retroactivity in light of their own state post-conviction procedures. In fact, the Court 
noted that it was the unique nature of federal habeas corpus review that prompted the 
standards underpinning the Teague analysis. "A close reading of the Teague opinion 
makes clear that the rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal 
habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in 
their own post-conviction proceedings than required by that opinion." Danforlh, 552 
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u.s. at 277. In fact, because the Teague retroactivity analysis was so squarely the 
product of the particular concerns of the federal court in not disturbing the finality of 
state law convictions, the Danforth Court further noted that these same principles of 
comity might actually provide a strong basis for state courts to provide much broader 
application of precedent in their own state post-conviction actions. Id. at 279-280. 
Idaho's unique jurisprudence regarding collateral challenges to criminal 
convictions under the UPCPA does not share in the salient features of collateral 
challenges under federal habeas that have motivated the federal courts to apply such 
rigid and incredibly narrow standards for a watershed rule for purposes of retroactivity. 
This is particularly the case with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which 
normally cannot be brought on direct review and must instead be brought through post-
conviction under Idaho's unique jurisprudence and statutory law. 
In Idaho, a defendant may raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel 
either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both. 
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992). While the defendant may, in theory, 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the practical reality is 
that resolution of such claims almost always turns on facts outside the record on appeal 
and, therefore, expansion of the record through post-conviction is usually required in 
order to properly adjudicate such claims. See, e.g., State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551-
552 (2001); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791 (1985); Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 
296 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 66-67 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. 
Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549-550 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374,375-
376 (Ct. App. 1993). Given this, appellate courts in Idaho routinely decline to entertain 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel when they are raised on direct appeal. 
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Elison, 135 Idaho at 551-552; Santana, 135 Idaho at 66-67; Saxton, 133 Idaho at 549-
550; Mitchell, 124 Idaho at 376. 
The requirement that a claim of ineffective assistance be raised through a 
petition for post-conviction relief, rather than on direct appeal, is all but inescapable for 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel of the type addressed by Padilla, where the 
alleged deficiency relates directly to the private consultation occurring between an 
attorney and client regarding the decision whether to plead guilty. See Mitchell, 124 
Idaho at 376 (recognizing that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requiring 
development outside the trial record typically include issues as to "the adequacy of 
counsel's communications with the defendant."). Under Idaho's unique post-conviction 
jurisprudence, such claims would necessarily need to be litigated through collateral 
attacks in post-conviction, rather than on direct review, because they hinge on 
evidentiary matters outside the record on direct appeal. Therefore, the standards for 
justiciability of such claims under Idaho law is the exact opposite as those present in 
federal habeas corpus - rather than requiring that such claims be raised in prior 
proceedings in order to properly exhaust state remedies, these issues of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be raised in any proceeding other than a post-conviction 
petition under Idaho law. 
Under requirements of exhaustion of remedies, review of any constitutional issue 
under federal habeas corpus presupposes that the defendant has already had a prior 
opportunity to litigate the claim at issue. Because collateral attacks in post-conviction 
are almost always a defendant's first and sole state mechanism to raise claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel of the type described in Padilla, Mr. Medina asserts 
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such claims sufficiently implicate the fundamental fairness of the proceedings so as to 
be deemed a watershed rule. 
2. Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence With Regard To Our More Expansive State 
Statutory Right To Counsel Requires A Lesser Standard For Watershed 
Rules With Regard To Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant is 
only guaranteed the right to counsel at "critical stages" of the criminal proceedings. 
See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004). However, by statute, Idaho's unique 
jurisprudence provides a right to counsel that is broader in scope than that provided 
solely under the federal constitution and, therefore, reflects a heightened concern for 
protection of the right to counsel under Idaho law than inheres under the federal 
constitution. 
In addition to having an independent right to counsel under Article I, § 13 of the 
Idaho State Constitution, criminal defendants in Idaho have extensive rights to the 
assistance of counsel by virtue of statute. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-852. By statute in Idaho, 
a criminal defendant has the right to appointed counsel, "to the same extent as a person 
having his own counsel is so entitled," and is further entitled to the assistance of 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings under most circumstances. See I.C. §§ 19-852, 
19-4904. Idaho's general statutory right to the appointment of counsel grants an 
indigent defendant the right to appointment of counsel for any proceeding in which 
retained counsel would be entitled to appear. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 281-282 
(1992). Moreover, this right exists, regardless of whether the right of appointed counsel 
to appear in a proceeding, "comes from constitution, statute, regulation or ordinance." 
Id. at 282; see also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-843 (2009). In addition, Idaho 
provides for a more expansive right to counsel by granting the right to counsel in order 
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to pursue a discretionary petition for review before the Idaho Supreme Court - a right 
that was expressly rejected under the Sixth Amendment by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Compare Hernandez, 127 Idaho 685, 687-688 (1995) to Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 
610-616 (1974). 
Especially noteworthy is the fact that, by Idaho's unique jurisprudence and under 
our statutory laws, a defendant enjoys a statutory right to counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings. See, e.g., Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-793 (2004). This is 
quite significant with regard to our state's heightened protection of the right to counsel, 
as the right to counsel in post-conviction actions is expressly not recognized under the 
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 
555-556 (1987). 
In fact, the Court in Finley expressly recognized that the standards for the right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment are more restrictive than the very standard that is 
in place by statute in Idaho. In Finley, the Court held that the federal constitution does 
not require the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant merely because an 
affluent defendant may retain one for the proceeding in question. Id. at 556. 
'''The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that 
may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his 
conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present 
his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process." Id. 
Thus, the federal standard for the right to counsel is expressly more limited than 
that afforded to defendants by statute in Idaho - while the Sixth Amendment contains 
no guarantee that an indigent defendant has the same right to the representation of 
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counsel as the affluent one, Idaho recognizes just such a right by operation of I.C. § 19-
852. See also Young, 122 Idaho at 281-282. 
Moreover, once a statutory right to counsel has been conferred under Idaho law, 
this right carries with it all the guarantees of effective assistance of counsel as does the 
federal right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. See Hernandez v. State, 
127 Idaho at 687. As was noted by the Court in Hernandez, the "statutory right to 
counsel would be a hollow right if it did not guarantee the defendant the right to effective 
assistance of counseL" Id. Therefore, this Court treats the statutory grant of the right to 
counsel under Idaho law as inherently conferring the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. Id. 
Because Idaho provides for much broader protection of the right to counsel than 
that recognized under the federal constitution, Mr. Medina asserts that this Court should 
account for this heightened protection when reviewing retroactive application of new 
rules of law that involve the right to competent representation of counsel. This is 
particularly the case where the rule in question involves issues of critical importance to 
the competent representation of criminal defendants, as is the case with Padilla. 
The Court in Rhoades has indicated that the standard for watershed rules in 
Idaho encompasses review for whether the rule implicates the fundamental fairness of 
the proceedings, and that Idaho courts independently review whether a rule would meet 
this standard in light of Idaho's jurisprudence and our state constitutional standards. 
See Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 134. In light of Idaho's more expansive right to counsel, 
both under our constitution and under our statutory laws, Mr. Medina asserts that the 
standards articulated for competent representation of counsel under Padilla should be 
deemed a watershed rule by this Court. 
15 
D. The Statute Of Limitations To File A Post-Conviction Petition Should Be Tolled In 
Mr. Medina's Case Because He Was Denied Due Process Of Law 
Mr. Medina seeks equitable relief and requests that this Court hold that the 
statute of limitations be tolled for him to file his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Mr. Medina asserts that due to the change in the law and his trial attorney's actions, he 
was denied due process of law under both the federal and state constitutions. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902, an application for post-conviction relief must be filed 
within one year from the expiration of the time for appeal, or from the determination of 
an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is 
later. I.C. § 19-4902; Evensioskyv. State, 136 Idaho 189,191 (2001). However, under 
some circumstances the statutory time limitation for filing a petition for post-conviction 
relief may be tolled. Idaho has recognized equitable tolling relating to post-conviction 
petitions in two circumstances: "(1) where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-
state facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access to Idaho 
legal materials; (2) and where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication renders a 
petitioner incompetent and prevents the petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to 
his conviction." Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960 (Ct. App. 2003). The Court of 
Appeals recently reaffirmed the existence of equitable tolling in cases which "raise 
important due process issues." Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,386 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Mr. Medina asserts that the constitutional rights implicated by Padilla "raise 
important due process issues." Id. Due to a change in the law effectuated by Padilla, 
Mr. Medina asserts that he was denied due process of law. Mr. Medina requests that 
this Court find that his case raises important due process issues and grant him 
equitable relief by tolling the statute of limitations and deem that his petition was timely 
filed. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Medina respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 21 st day of May, 2013. 
DIANE M. WALKER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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